Two embryonic cell lines have been used to develop COVID-19 vaccines: human embryonic kidney cells called HEK 293 and human embryonic retinal cells called PER.C6. The PER.C6 cell line is from an elective abortion in the Netherlands in 1985, and the HEK 293 cell line comes from an undisclosed source (either spontaneous miscarriage or elective abortion) in the Netherlands in about 1972.
Johnson & Johnson used PER.C6 cells in their COVID-19 vaccine development, and the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine used HEK 293 cells. CanSino Biologics and Gamaleya Research Institute’s Sputnik V vaccines have also used HEK 293 cells.
Moderna and Pfizer/BioNTech used HEK 293 cells in their proof-of-concept tests to see effectively take up the genetic instructions contained in these vaccines and produce the required spike protein. But human embryonic cell lines were not used to make either company’s final vaccine.
HEK 293 and PER.C6 cell lines have been genetically altered to include the part of the adenovirus instructions that trigger replication of adenoviruses. This allows the production of a large amount of the final vaccination product and allows the removal of the adenoviral replication instructions in the vaccine.
Johnson & Johnson
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Michael Yeadon was a scientific researcher and vice president at drugs giant Pfizer Inc. He co-founded a successful biotech. Then his career took an unexpected turn.
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/health-coronavirus-vaccines-s
Wikipedia snapshot from 9 March 2021:
Year | Company | Settlement | Violation(s) | Product(s) | Laws allegedly violated (if applicable) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2012 | GlaxoSmithKline[1][6] | $3 billion ($1B criminal, $2B civil) | Criminal: Off-label promotion, failure to disclose safety data. Civil: paying kickbacks to physicians, making false and misleading statements concerning the safety of Avandia, reporting false best prices and underpaying rebates owed under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program | Avandia (not providing safety data), Wellbutrin, Paxil (promotion of paediatric use), Advair, Lamictal, Zofran, Imitrex, Lotronex, Flovent, Valtrex | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2009 | Pfizer[2] | $2.3 billion | Off-label promotion, kickbacks | Bextra, Geodon, Zyvox, Lyrica | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2013 | Johnson & Johnson[7] | $2.2 billion | Off-label promotion, kickbacks | Risperdal, Invega, Nesiritide | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2012 | Abbott Laboratories[8] | $1.5 billion | Off-label promotion | Depakote | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2009 | Eli Lilly[9] | $1.4 billion | Off-label promotion | Zyprexa | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2001 | TAP Pharmaceutical Products[10] | $875 million | Medicare fraud, kickbacks | Lupron | False Claims Act, Prescription Drug Marketing Act |
2012 | Amgen[11] | $762 million | Off-label promotion, kickbacks | Aranesp | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2010 | GlaxoSmithKline[12] | $750 million | Poor manufacturing practices | Kytril, Bactroban, Paxil CR, Avandamet | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2005 | Serono[13] | $704 million | Off-label promotion, kickbacks, monopolistic practices | Serostim | False Claims Act |
2008 | Merck[14] | $650 million | Medicare fraud, kickbacks | Zocor, Vioxx, Pepsid | False Claims Act, Medicaid Rebate Statute |
2007 | Purdue Pharma[15] | $601 million | Off-label promotion | Oxycontin | False Claims Act |
2010 | Allergan[16] | $600 million | Off-label promotion | Botox | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2010 | AstraZeneca[17] | $520 million | Off-label promotion, kickbacks | Seroquel | False Claims Act |
2007 | Bristol-Myers Squibb[18] | $515 million | Off-label promotion, kickbacks, Medicare fraud | Abilify, Serzone | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2002 | Schering-Plough[19] | $500 million | Poor manufacturing practices | Claritin | FDA Current Good Manufacturing Practices |
2006 | Mylan[20] | $465 million | Misclassification under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program | EpiPen (epinephrine) | False Claims Act |
2006 | Schering-Plough[21] | $435 million | Off-label promotion, kickbacks, Medicare fraud | Temodar, Intron A, K-Dur, Claritin RediTabs | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2004[22] | Pfizer | $430 million | Off-label promotion | Neurontin | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2008 | Cephalon[23] | $425 million | Off-label promotion[23] | Actiq, Gabitril, Provigil | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2010 | Novartis[24] | $423 million | Off-label promotion, kickbacks | Trileptal | False Claims Act, FDCA |
2003 | AstraZeneca[25] | $355 million | Medicare fraud | Zoladex | Prescription Drug Marketing Act |
2004 | Schering-Plough[26] | $345 million | Medicare fraud, kickbacks | Claritin | False Claims Act, Anti-Kickback Statute |
- A third of all military personnel are refusing the COVID-19 vaccine
- Some are citing the rushed rollout of the anthrax vaccine in the 1990s as the reason why they do not want to receive the new COVID jab
- In 1997, the military made it mandatory for service personnel to receive the anthrax shot; thousands subsequently complained of debilitating side effects
- A lengthy legal battle ensued, before the courts determined that the FDA hadn’t ‘adequately studied’ how effective the shot was against the inhalation anthrax
- Commanders concede they need to do a better job of messaging and allaying fears among military members that they are being used as ‘testers’ for the jab
- Other personnel are citing wild conspiracy theories about the vaccine, including one who refused the shot for fear it was implanting a tracking device
Drugs are a risky business and, for equity investors hoping to eventually share in the profits, each stage of development presents an escalated risk. Lo reasoned that substantially lowering the risks, even if it meant correspondingly lowering the rewards, could attract investment instead from ordinary bond markets—that is, from managers of pension funds, university endowments, and sovereign-wealth funds, who control a great deal of money and generally invest in low-risk, low-return assets.
Given how uncertain vaccine markets are, the paper notes, governments (“public-sector interventions,” and so forth), would need to guarantee a vaccine bond by committing in advance to purchase and stockpile vaccines. The paper’s most creative suggestion is for a subscription model, a kind of vaccine Netflix, where governments would pay an annual fee to a new international-development fund, one that could perhaps be managed by the G7. The fund could float a bond to both advance vaccine biotechs and to make market commitments to Big Pharma. The virus, the markets, and the science are global.
…it would be much better for the government to say that the money is not from taxpayers. “We’re borrowing it from the rest of the world. And if and when you succeed, or any of the other hundred and fifty projects—that could have been funded, but aren’t being funded right now—succeeds, all the bond holders will get paid. That would be great. Everybody earns a return.”
AstraZeneca has been granted protection from future product liability claims related to its COVID-19 vaccine hopeful by most of the countries with which it has struck supply agreements, a senior executive told Reuters.